Secret-sharing schemes with optimal and universal communication overheads have been obtained independently by Bitar et al. and Huang et al. However, their constructions require a finite field of size q > n, where n is the number of shares, and do not provide strong security. In this paper, we give a general framework to construct communication efficient secretsharing schemes based on sequences of nested linear codes, which allows to use, in particular, algebraic geometry codes and allows to obtain strongly secure and communication-efficient schemes. Using this framework, we obtain: 1) schemes with universal and close to optimal communication overheads for arbitrarily large lengths n and a fixed finite field; 2) the first construction of schemes with universal and optimal communication overheads and optimal strong security (for restricted lengths), having, in particular, the component-wise security advantages of perfect schemes and the security and storage efficiency of ramp schemes; and 3) schemes with universal and close to optimal communication overheads and close to optimal strong security defined for arbitrarily large lengths n and a fixed finite field.
I. INTRODUCTION
A SECRET sharing scheme [4] , [28] is a procedure to encode a secret into n shares, given bijectively to n parties, in such a way that some specified collections of shares give all the information about the secret, while other collections of shares give no information at all. It is usual to specify such collections by threshold values t < r : the secret can be recovered from any r shares, while no collection of t shares gives any information about the secret.
Traditionally, efforts have been made to obtain schemes where r is as low and t is as large as possible. The first construction, by Shamir [28] , consists of a secret sharing scheme attaining information rate 1/n (perfect scheme) and any threshold values 0 ≤ t < r ≤ n with t = r − 1, which are optimal. Later, this construction was extended in [5] and [37] Manuscript received November 15, 2016 to higher information rates /n and threshold values t = r −, which are again optimal. Schemes where the information rate is /n > 1/n (non-perfect schemes) are also called ramp schemes, and allow the shares to be smaller than the secret, hence allowing more flexibility and efficiency in terms of storage, at the cost of a lower privacy threshold t < r − 1. All these previous optimal constructions require a finite field of size q > n, which in many situations requires performing computations over large fields, reduces the storage efficiency since the shares are larger, and provides less robustness against erasures (see Subsection I-A).
In the works [23] , [25] and later in [10] , [14] , and [21] , more general frameworks for constructing secret sharing schemes are given in terms of linear (block) codes. Thanks to these approaches, Shamir's scheme is extended to schemes based on algebraic geometry codes [6] , [8] - [10] , [12] , [14] , which may have arbitrarily large length n for any fixed finite field at the cost of achieving close to optimal parameters, instead of optimal, being the difference dependent only on the field size. This implies that, for a given difference with respect to the optimal case, we may fix a suitable field size and the achievable lengths are not restricted.
On the other hand, as noticed first in [35] and then in [19] , the overall amount of communication between the contacted parties and the user (decoding bandwidth), in a given secret sharing scheme, can be decreased by contacting more than r shares. A lower bound on the communication overhead (the difference between the decoding bandwidth and the information contained in the secret) was first given in [35] for perfect schemes, and then in [19] for the general case.
A modification of Shamir's secret sharing scheme was given independently in [3] and in [19] for any information rate, with optimal threshold values r and t, and where optimal communication overheads are simultaneously achieved (universal) for any δ contacted shares and any δ in an arbitrary set ⊆ [r, n]. However, as Shamir's scheme, this construction requires a finite field of size q > n, which in this case is more critical since shares are exponentiated by a number α of order at least n for fixed information rates (see Subsection I-A).
Therefore, the following question arises naturally: can we modify or extend the constructions in [3] and [19] so that we may apply algebraic geometry codes and hence obtain near optimal thresholds and universal near optimal communication overheads for arbitrarily large lengths n and a fixed finite field? 0018-9448 © 2018 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information. In this work, we answer the previous question positively, giving a general framework for constructing communication efficient secret sharing schemes based on sequences of nested linear codes in a similar way to that of [10] , [14] , [21] , [23] , and [25] . Afterwards and using algebraic geometry codes, we obtain the desired communication efficient secret sharing schemes of arbitrary length and fixed finite field. More concretely, thanks to our general framework, we reduce the problem of finding long communication efficient secret sharing schemes to the well-known problem of finding algebraic curves with many rational points and low genus [20] , [31] , [34] . We highlight here that such secret sharing schemes can be constructed explicitly whenever the generator matrices of the corresponding algebraic geometry codes are known. This is the case of the families in [16] and [29] and [30] , [32] , and [33] .
Again in this case, the difference with the lowest communication overheads depends only on the field size, and hence for a given defect with respect to the optimal value, we may fix a suitable field size, and the achievable lengths are not restricted. Moreover, as we will show, one can see the defect with respect to the optimal case just on the privacy threshold t, as in previous schemes based on algebraic geometry codes, meaning that the obtained communication overheads give the same improvement on the reconstruction threshold r as in the optimal case (see Example 17) .
The introduced universal construction will expand the alphabet size in a similar way to that of the universal constructions in [3] and [19] . As in [3] , we will also give a non-universal construction that has a significant smaller alphabet.
On the other hand, our general framework also allows us to obtain schemes that are communication efficient and strongly secure at the same time. Strongly secure schemes were introduced in [37] , and allow to keep components of the secret safe even when more than t shares are eavesdropped. In such a scheme, if the secret is constituted by components (each considered as a secret by itself), where /n is the information rate, then no information about any tuple of − μ components is leaked if t + μ shares are eavesdropped. In particular, in an optimal strongly secure ramp scheme with information rate /n and also optimal thresholds t = r − , no information about any component of the secret is leaked by eavesdropping any r − 1 shares, as in Shamir's optimal perfect scheme (although information about the whole secret may still leak), while having the storage advantages of optimal ramp schemes (since it actually is an optimal ramp scheme).
In conclusion, an optimal strongly secure ramp scheme has the component-wise security advantages of perfect schemes and the security and storage efficiency of ramp schemes.
By means of the framework developed in this paper, we obtain the first construction of a secret sharing scheme with universal and optimal communication efficiency and optimal strong security at the same time. However, it requires a finite field of size q > + n, as previous constructions of optimal strongly secure schemes [26] . As before, to relax this requirement, we give another construction based on algebraic geometry codes, whose communication efficiency and strong security are close to the optimal values (again depending on q and not on n), while having arbitrarily large lengths n over a fixed finite field. Such strongly secure schemes based on algebraic geometry codes were obtained in [24] without communication efficiency.
For convenience of the reader, a comparison between the obtained constructions in this paper (Corollaries 14, 25 and 26) and the ones in the literature is summarized in Fig. 1 .
A. Motivation and Meaning of Our Contributions
As mentioned at the beginning of the Introduction, the optimal schemes in [3] and [19] require that q = (n), whereas those based on algebraic geometry codes may have arbitrarily large lengths n for a fixed field size q. Here we develop why this relaxed condition may be crucial in the applications: 1) Secure multi-party computation [2] , [6] , [8] - [10] , [12] , [13] allows to securely compute any function [1] , [7] . Such functions are usually defined over small fields and computing them requires several rounds of operations. Hence a field size q = (n) may be inefficient and restrictive for large number of parties n.
The schemes in [3] and [19] and this work are linear, which allows to securely compute any linear function or any binary function, and is of interest, for instance, in additively homomorphic verifiable secret sharing. Our schemes are multiplicative for certain parameters. See Appendix B for details.
2) The known communication efficient schemes [3] , [19] require exponentiating secret and share sizes by a large number α, which reduces storage flexibility. In the best of scenarios (Construction 1), for fixed information rate L we have that α = λn for a constant L < λ < 1. Thus each share in [3] and [19] has size at least n λn , that is (n log(n)) bits. In this case, our schemes based on asymptotically good algebraic geometry codes allow the secret and share sizes to be O(q λn ), for some L < λ < 1 and small q. Hence each share is of O(n) bits. See the observations at the end of Subsection IV-C.
3) On most erasure channels, increasing code lengths (number of participants) while keeping or decreasing symbol sizes (share sizes) provides more robustness even if the allowed fraction of erasures is lower. This is even more critical on adversarial scenarios where the adversary chooses which fraction of symbols to erase. For instance assume that we have a scheme with length 1000 and symbol size 2 16 , and a second scheme with length 4000 and symbol size 2 4 . If the adversary erases 1/4 of symbols of size 2 4 , he or she may make reconstruction impossible when using the first scheme, even if it has optimal reconstruction threshold, while the second scheme may recover the original data without problems. The fact that share sizes can be of O(n) bits in contrast with (n log(n)) bits, makes our schemes more robust in this sense when compared to the schemes in [3] and [19] . See also [33, Example VI] and Figure 2 for a comparison of some explicit parameters when using Hermitian codes. 4) Finally, the strong security added in Section V to the previous constructions also helps alleviate the storage requirements of perfect schemes, while keeping their component-wise security.
B. Organization of the Paper
After some preliminaries from the literature in Section II, the results in this paper are organized as follows: In Section III, we give two general constructions of communication efficient secret sharing schemes based on linear codes, which are inspired by the staircase presentation in [3] . Construction 1 aims at obtaining low communication overheads for sets of size δ for one fixed value r ≤ δ ≤ n, while Construction 2 aims at obtaining low communication overheads for sets of size δ, for any δ in an arbitrary set ⊆ [r, n], simultaneously, at the cost of a larger alphabet than Construction 1. In Section IV, we specialize the previous linear codes to algebraic geometry codes, and see that the resulting schemes have close to optimal communication overheads, while their lengths are not bounded by the field size. In Section V, we give special cases of Constructions 1 and 2 from Section III that aim at achieving strong security. By specializing the linear codes to MDS codes (such as Reed-Solomon codes), we obtain the first construction of schemes with universal optimal communication efficiency and optimal strong security at the same time, at the cost of a large field size q (but still of the order of n). On the other hand, by specializing the linear codes to algebraic geometry codes, we obtain schemes with close to optimal communication efficiency and strong security, while having lengths not bounded by the field size.
II. DEFINITIONS AND PRELIMINARIES

A. Notation
Throughout the paper, q denotes a fixed prime power, and F q denotes the finite field with q elements. For positive integers m and n, we denote by F n q the vector space of row vectors of length n over F q , and we denote by F m×n q the vector space of m × n matrices with components in F q .
We also denote [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n} and [m, n] = {m, m + 1, . . . , n − 1, n} if m ≤ n. For any vector x ∈ F n q , any matrix X ∈ F m×n q and any set I ⊆ [n], we denote by x I and X I the vector in F # I q and the matrix in F m×# I q obtained by restricting x to the components indexed by I and restricting X to the columns indexed by I , respectively.
Sets C ⊆ F n q and D ⊆ F m×n q are called linear codes if they are vector spaces over F q . We denote by C ⊥ the dual of the code C with respect to the usual inner product in F n q and, for a set I ⊆ [n], we define the restriction of C and D to I , respectively, as the linear codes
and we define their shortened codes in I as the linear codes
Finally, for random variables X and Y , we denote by H (X), H (X|Y ) and I (X; Y ) the entropy of X, conditional entropy of X given Y , and the mutual information between X and Y , respectively, taking logarithms with some specified base. See [11, Ch. 2] .
B. Communication Efficient Secret Sharing
We will consider the general definition of secret sharing schemes from [19, Definition 1] .
Definition 1 (Secret Sharing Schemes [19] ): Let A be an alphabet, and let n, , r and t be positive integers. An (n, , r, t) A secret sharing scheme is a randomized encoding function F : A −→ A n (meaning that F(s) may take several values in A n with a given probability distribution, for each s ∈ A ) such that:
1) It has r -reconstruction: For any secret s ∈ A , if x = F(s) and I ⊆ [n] is of size at least r , then
2) It has t-privacy: For any secret s ∈ A , if x = F(s) and I ⊆ [n] is of size at most t, then
We define the information rate of the scheme as /n. This definition includes most of the classical proposals for secret sharing schemes [3] - [6] , [8] - [10] , [12] - [14] , [17] , [19] , [21] , [23] - [26] , [28] , [35] , [37] . As usual in the literature, we identify the i -th share x i with the i -th party, hence the set [n] represents both the n parties and their corresponding n shares.
Traditional efforts have been made in order to obtain schemes where r is as low as possible, while keeping t and large with respect to n. The obvious benefit of a low value of r is that less parties need to be contacted, hence it is expected that the amount of transmitted information to recover the secret is lower. However, as noticed first in [35] and later in [19] , it is possible to recover the secret while transmitting less information, as long as more parties are contacted. Observe that, in the previous definition, when contacting r parties to recover the secret, we use their whole shares. However if more parties are contacted, then we may preprocess their shares so that the overall amount of transmitted information is lower.
Formally, let I ⊆ [n] be such that # I ≥ r , let i ∈ I , and let E I,i : A −→ B I,i be preprocessing functions, where #B I,i ≤ #A. The existence of decoding functions D I :
for all s ∈ A . Observe that each preprocessing function E I,i may depend on i and I . However, we will simply write E when i and I are understood from the context. We may now define the communication overhead and decoding bandwidth as follows:
Definition 2 (Communication Overhead and Decoding Bandwidth [19] ): For a set I ⊆ [n] and preprocessing functions satisfying (1), we define the communication overhead and decoding bandwidth of I , respectively, as
where logarithms in the entropy functions are with base #A.
Observe that, after preprocessing the i -th share, the amount of information required to be transmitted by the i -th party is H (E(x i )). Without assuming any processing of the overall information in the variables E(x i ), for i ∈ I , the total transmitted information by the contacted parties is just the sum of H (E(x i )) for i ∈ I . Hence the decoding bandwidth is the total amount of information transmitted by the parties indexed by I . Observe that
where the first inequality is a particular case of [11, Th. 2.6.6] and the second inequality is a particular case of [11, Exercise 2.4]. Therefore, the communication overhead measures the amount of overall extra information transmitted by the contacted parties.
From now on, we will assume that the secret s is a uniform random variable on A . To measure the quality of a scheme, we will use the following bounds given in [19, Proposition 1] and [19, Th. 1]:
Proposition 3 [19] : For a set I ⊆ [n] and given preprocessing functions, the following bounds hold:
Observe that the definition of communication overhead in [19, Definition 2] takes the values log(#B I,i ) instead of the smaller values H (E(x i )) (with base #A). However, the proofs of the previous bounds work in the same way.
C. Secret Sharing Schemes Based on Linear Codes
A classical approach to constructing secret sharing schemes is by the so-called coset coding schemes. These were first considered by Wyner in [36] for the problem of reliable and secure communication over wire-tap channels, which may be seen as secret sharing. A particular case is obtained when choosing the family of cosets as the quotient vector space of two linear codes over F q , as considered in [10] , [14] , [21] , [23] , [25] , [25] , and [38] , and which generalize Shamir's secret sharing scheme [28] . The alphabet of these schemes
Definition 4 (Nested Coset Coding Schemes [10] , [14] , [21] , [23] , [25] , [38] ): A nested linear code pair is a pair of linear codes C 2 C 1 ⊆ F n q . Choose a vector space W such that
The nested coset coding scheme associated to C 1 and C 2 is the secret sharing scheme F :
To evaluate the reconstruction and privacy thresholds r and t of a nested coset coding scheme, we need the concept of minimum Hamming distance of a nested linear code pair [14] and of a linear code C ⊆ F n q , defined respectively as follows:
where wt(c) = #{i ∈ [n] | c i = 0} is the Hamming weight of the vector c ∈ F n q . The following result is proven in [14, Corollary 1.7]: Lemma 5 [14] : The nested coset coding scheme based on the nested linear code pair C 2 C 1 ⊆ F n q is an (n, , r, t) F q secret sharing scheme with = dim(C 1 /C 2 ) and
Remark 6: We will implicitly assume that
, then the i -th share not only contains no information about the secret, but added to any set of shares, it does not increase the overall amount of information, hence it may be removed.
III. COMMUNICATION EFFICIENT SECRET SHARING SCHEMES BASED ON NESTED LINEAR CODES
We will now present a general construction of communication efficient secret sharing schemes based on linear codes that is inspired by the constructions obtained independently in [3] and [19, Sec. IV]. Our construction generalizes the previous two. We will explain how at the end of each subsection.
We will present two versions of it. The first reduces communication overheads by contacting any δ ≥ r shares for one fixed value of δ, while the second reduces communication overheads by contacting any δ ≥ r shares for all δ in an arbitrary set ⊆ [r, n], hence achieving more flexibility.
In the rest of the paper, the alphabet is A = F α q , for a positive integer α. The advantage of the first construction with respect to the second is a significant smaller parameter α, hence a significant smaller alphabet.
We will measure information taking logarithms in base q, instead of q α . This only affects entropy and mutual information by product with α (see [11, Lemma 2.1.2]).
A. Construction 1: Non-Universal but Small Alphabet
Take linear codes C 2 C 1 ⊆ C ⊆ F n q . The codes C 1 and C 2 will play the same role as in Subsection II-C. The staircase structure of Construction 1 combined with the larger code C makes it possible to recover the secret without downloading some (depending on the parameters of C and C 2 ) of the random messages introduced by C 2 (see Definition 4), hence reducing the decoding bandwidth. This idea was discussed in the original staircase constructions (see [3, Example 2] ).
We now fix positive integers as follows (inequalities are used to apply lower bounds on minimum Hamming distances):
Finally, fix a generator matrix of C of the form:
. Now, for a secret S ∈ F α× q , divide it into two subsecrets as follows:
where S = S 1 in the case α = . Next, generate uniformly at random a matrix
which is a column vector c i ∈ F α×1 q , that is, a symbol in our alphabet A = F α q . For a set I ⊆ [n] and i ∈ I , the corresponding preprocessing function is
where E(c i ) is obtained by restricting c i ∈ F α×1 q to its first rows. We will need the following lemma, which is a direct consequence of [22, Lemma 1] together with [15, Lemma 2], as explained in the proof of [21, Th. 4] . We recall the proof for convenience of the reader.
Lemma 7 [15] , [21] , [22] :
, then C 2 I = C I . Proof: Recall the notation and definitions of restricted and shortened codes from Subsection II-A. The result [22, Lemma 1] states that
On the other hand, [15, Lemma 2] implies that
hence the result follows. Now we may prove the main result of this subsection: Theorem 1: The previous secret sharing scheme has information rate /n, reconstruction r , privacy t and, for any I ⊆ [n] with # I = δ, it holds that
Proof: We prove each item separately. 1) Reconstruction r : Take I ⊆ [n] of size at least r . From
By substracting S T 2 G 3 I , we see that we only need to decode
Again, we obtain S 1 by (5), since # I ≥ n − d(C 1 , C 2 ) + 1. Hence, we have obtained the whole secret S and proven that H (S|X I ) = 0.
2) Privacy t: Take I ⊆ [n] of size at most t. The eavesdropper obtains
This random variable W I has support inside the linear code
Recall from [11, Th. 2.6.4] that, if a random variable X has support in the set X , then H (X) ≤ log(#X ). Hence
On the other hand, using the analogous notation C α 2 I for C 2 instead of C, it holds that
since, given a value of S, the variable W I is a uniform random variable on an affine space obtained by translating the vector space C α 2 I . Hence we obtain that
where the last equality follows from Lemma 7 since
3) Communication Overhead and Decoding Bandwidth:
for each i ∈ I . Thus we may obtain S 1 and S T 2 by (5), since # I ≥ n − d(C, C 2 ) + 1, and hence we may obtain the whole secret S. In other words, (1) is satisfied.
On the other hand, E(c i ) is the uniform random variable on
Since C is not degenerate (see Remark 6) , it follows that
Hence, we have that
, and
Remark 8: Observe that H (E(c i )) = /α does not depend on I nor i ∈ I . Therefore, any choice of δ available parties may be contacted with the same communication costs and moreover, the information transmission from these parties may be performed in a balanced and parallel way.
We conclude by explaining how our Construction 1 generalizes that in [3, Sec. III-A]. The construction in [19, Sec. IV] is equivalent. Choose C 2 C 1 ⊆ C as nested Reed-Solomon codes of dimensions k 2 , k 1 and k, respectively. Choose t = k 2 , r = k 1 and δ = k. Observe that the communication overhead for a set I ⊆ [n] of size δ in the previous theorem coincides then with that in [3, eq. (4)], which also coincides with the optimal value given by (3) .
As is well-known, in this case we may take
as nested Vandermonde matrices. The shares in our Construction 1 are given by the columns in
whereas the shares in [3, Sec. III-A] are given by the columns in
We can see the equivalence of these two schemes as follows: First, considering S 1 or S T 1 makes no difference, since both are × matrices and contain the same part of the secret matrix S. Second, the placement of the matrices R 1 and R 2 makes no difference, since any choice of consecutive rows of a Vandermonde matrix can be seen again as a Vandermonde matrix. For the same reason, the matrix D could be chosen as any consecutive α − columns in (S T | R 1 ), in particular, we may choose D = S T 2 as in our case. These ways of restructuring the staircase construction work for Reed-Solomon codes due to the fact that any choice of consecutive rows of a Vandermonde matrices essentially gives a new Reed-Solomon code. This is not the case for general linear block codes. Hence it seems that our version of the staircase construction is necessary in general.
B. Construction 2: Universal but Large Alphabet
In this subsection, we extend the universal constructions from [3, Sec. VI] and [19, Sec . IV] to more general schemes and evaluate their communication overhead and decoding bandwidth. The objective is to obtain schemes with low communication overhead for all values of δ in a subset ⊆ [r, n], and not just one fixed value. The main requisites for this construction are a larger alphabet than in Construction 1 and the existence of an appropriate sequence of nested linear codes containing the main nested linear code pair, both depending on .
Take linear codes C 2 C 1 ⊆ F n q and fix positive integers:
Assume then that there exists a sequence of nested linear codes
The intuition behind the choice of the larger codes C ( j ) is the same as that of C in Construction 1 (see the beginning of Subsection III-A). Again, we define our parameters by inequalities in order to apply lower bounds on minimum Hamming distances.
Take a generator matrix G 2 ∈ F k 2 ×n q of C 2 and a generator matrix
Recursively and decreasingly in
where G (h) = G 1 . Next define the following positive integers, which are analogous to those in [19, eq. (11)]:
The secret space is again A = F α× q with alphabet A = F α q , and we also generate uniformly at random a matrix R ∈ F α×k 2 q .
In this case, we divide S and R as follows:
Next, we define the matrices
are the components (after some fixed rearrangement) of the matrix
For convenience, we define the matrices
for
which is a column vector c i ∈ F α×1 q , that is, a symbol in our alphabet A = F α q . For j = 1, 2, . . . , h, a set I ⊆ [n] of size δ j and i ∈ I , the corresponding preprocessing function is
We may now establish the main result of this subsection:
Theorem 2: The previous secret sharing scheme has information rate /n, reconstruction r , privacy t and, for any δ j ∈ and any I ⊆ [n] with # I = δ j , it holds that
Proof: We proceed as in the proof of Theorem 1: 1) Reconstruction r : Take I ⊆ [n] of size at least r . From
I as in the proof of Theorem 1, we may obtain
and thus we obtain S h−1 by (5), since # I ≥ n − d(C 1 , C 2 ) + 1. Now, we have also obtained D u,2 , for u = 1, 2, . . . , h − 2. Proceeding iteratively in the same way, we see that we may obtain all the matrices S j , for j = 1, 2, . . . , h, and thus we obtain the whole secret S. In particular, we have shown that H (S|X I ) = 0.
2) Privacy t: Take I ⊆ [n] of size at most t, and assume that the eavesdropper obtains
As in the proof of Theorem 1, we have that
I ) − dim(C 2 I )) = 0, where the last equality follows from Lemma 7, since
3) Communication overhead and decoding bandwidth:
for each i ∈ I . As in the proof of Theorem 1, we may obtain the matrix M j by (5), since # I ≥ n − d(C ( j ) , C 2 ) + 1. By definition, the matrices S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S j are contained in M j . On the other hand, the matrices D 1,h− j , D 2,h− j , . . . , D j,h− j are also contained in M j , and from them we obtain by definition S j +1 and D j +1,1 ,
Continuing iteratively in this way, we may obtain all S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S h and hence the secret matrix S. In other words, we have proven that the preprocessing functions satisfy (1).
Finally, E j (c i ) is the uniform random variable on
Since C ( j ) is not degenerate (see Remark 6) , it follows that
Remark 9: Observe, as in the previous subsection, that H (E j (c i )) = /α j depends on j (that is, on δ = δ j ) but does not depend on I nor i ∈ I . Therefore, for a fixed δ ∈ , any δ available parties may be contacted with the same communication costs, and the information transmission from these parties may be performed in a balanced and parallel way.
As in the previous subsection, our Construction 2 specializes to the construction in [3, Sec. VI] and [19, Sec. IV] by choosing C 2 C 1 and C ( j ) as nested Reed-Solomon codes of dimensions k 2 , k 1 and k ( j ) , respectively, and where t = k 2 , r = k 1 and δ j = k ( j ) , for j = 1, 2, . . . , h. The communication overhead for a set I ⊆ [n] of size δ j in the previous theorem coincides then with that in [3, eq. (4)], which also coincides with the optimal value given by (3) . The details of how our Construction 2 extends that in [3, Sec. IV] is analogous to those given at the end of Subsection III-A, although the notation is now more cumbersome.
IV. COMMUNICATION EFFICIENT SECRET SHARING SCHEMES BASED ON ALGEBRAIC GEOMETRY CODES
In this section, we will see that algebraic geometry codes fit into the previous two constructions of communication efficient secret sharing schemes, and allow to obtain schemes with arbitrarily large length n while keeping the field size q fixed and keeping low communication overhead, although not necessarily optimal. When using appropriate sequences of algebraic geometry codes, we will see that the difference with the optimal case only depends on q, and not on the length n. Hence, for a given defect with respect to the optimal case, we only need to fix a suitable field size q, and then let n be arbitrarily large.
Algebraic geometry codes fit in both Construction 1 and Construction 2 since it is easy to find sequences of nested algebraic geometry codes contained in and containing a given one, as we will see. We refer to [18] , [12, Sec. 12.7] , and [31] for general references on algebraic geometry codes. We also remark here that generator matrices of algebraic geometry codes (thus secret sharing schemes) can be explicitly and efficiently constructed in many cases (for instance, the codes in [16] and [29] or [30] , [32] , and [33] ). A good brief explanation of what is needed is given at the end of [31, Sec. 2.3] . Basically, one needs to obtain expressions of rational places and Riemann-Roch spaces (see also Example 18) , which we define now.
Consider an irreducible projective curve X over F q (which in this paper means irreducible over the algebraic closure of F q ) with algebraic function field F , and let g = g(X ) = g(F ) be its genus. Points in X correspond with places in F and we say that they are rational if they are rational over F q (have coordinates over F q ). A divisor over X is a formal sum D = P∈X μ P P, for integers μ P ∈ Z which are all zero except for a finite number. The support of D is defined as {P ∈ X | μ P = 0}, and D is called rational if all points in its support are rational. We define the degree of the rational divisor D as deg(D) = P∈X μ P ∈ Z. All divisors considered in this paper (except in Appendix B) will be rational.
On the other hand, for divisors D = P∈X μ P P and E = P∈X λ P P, we write D E if μ P ≤ λ P , for all P ∈ X . For an algebraic function f ∈ F , we define its divisor 
Finally, for rational divisors D = P 1 + P 2 +· · ·+ P n and G over X with disjoint supports and where the points P i are pairwise distinct, we define the corresponding algebraic geometry code (see [31, eq. (2. 3)] or [18, Definition 2.64]), or AG code for short, as the following linear code:
We will need the following two well-known results on the parameters of algebraic geometry codes. The first is the well-known Goppa bound [ Lemma 10 (Goppa Bound [18] , [31] ): If deg(G) < n and C = C(D, G), or if 2g − 2 < deg(G) < n and C = C(D, G) ⊥ , then
The following lemma is [31, Corollary 2.2.3(b)] (see also [18, Th. 2 
.65]):
Lemma 11 [18] , [31] :
A. Algebraic Geometry Codes for Constructions 1 and 2
Let the notation be as in the beginning of this section. In the following two propositions, we gather the parameters obtained in Constructions 1 and 2 when using AG codes. We start presenting the result for Construction 1. We omit its proof, since it is analogous and simpler to that of Construction 2.
Proposition 12: Let X be an irreducible projective curve over F q , let P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n be pairwise distinct rational points on X , and let G 2 , G 1 and G be rational divisors on X whose supports do not contain the previous points P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n , and such that
The secret sharing scheme in Construction 1 using the linear codes
where D = P 1 + P 2 + · · · + P n , has the following parameters: 1) Information rate /n = (deg(G 1 ) − deg(G 2 ))/n, 2) Reconstruction r = deg(G 1 ) + 1, 3) Privacy t = deg(G 2 ) − 2g + 1, and for any I ⊆ [n] of size δ = deg(G) + 1, it holds that
We now present and prove the analogous result for Construction 2. For simplicity, we gather the main assumptions in the following paragraph:
Assumptions (A): Let X be an irreducible projective curve over F q and let P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n be pairwise distinct rational points on X . Let 2g < r ≤ n, let ⊆ [r, n] with elements (2) , G (1) be rational divisors on X whose supports do not contain the previous points P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n . Define D = P 1 + P 2 + · · · + P n and assume also that
Proposition 13: If the assumptions (A) hold, then the secret sharing scheme in Construction 2 using the linear codes
for j = 1, 2, . . . , h, has the following parameters: 1) Information rate /n = (deg(G 1 ) − deg(G 2 ))/n, 2) Reconstruction r = deg(G 1 ) + 1, 3) Privacy t = deg(G 2 ) − 2g + 1, and, for any δ ∈ and any I ⊆ [n] of size δ, it holds that
Proof: It follows from combining Theorem 2, Lemma 10 and Lemma 11. Observe that, since G 2 G 1 and G ( j ) G ( j −1) , then L(G 2 ) ⊆ L(G 1 ) and L(G ( j ) ) ⊆ L(G ( j −1) ) and hence C 2 ⊆ C 1 and C ( j ) ⊆ C ( j −1) , for j = 2, 3, . . . , h, where inclusions are strict due to Lemma 11 
and therefore the communication overhead decreases as the number of contacted shares δ increases, as expected.
As remarked in Section I, we can see that the defect with respect to the optimal case is only on the privacy thresholds, meaning that if and r are given, t = r −−2g differs from the optimal value r − by 2g, but the decoding bandwidths present the same improvement on r as the optimal constructions in [3] and [19] (see also Example 17):
for any δ ∈ and any set I of size δ. Observe that, if t = r − is optimal, then the optimal value given by (4) coincides with that in (8) when substituting t by r − . For more concrete constructions and existential proofs and to obtain the largest possible lengths, it is usual to consider the so-called one-point algebraic geometry codes. These are AG codes where the support of the divisor G is constituted by a single point. That is, G = μQ for some rational point Q ∈ X and integer μ ∈ Z. It holds that deg(G) = μ. The next consequence follows:
Corollary 14: If there exists an irreducible projective curve X over F q with N ≥ n + 1 rational points and genus g, then for any 0 ≤ t < r ≤ n with r − t > 2g and any ⊆ [r, n] with r ∈ , there exists a secret sharing scheme with information rate /n = (r − t − 2g)/n, reconstruction r , privacy t and, for any δ ∈ and any I ⊆ [n] of size δ, it holds that
Moreover, the scheme can be explicitly constructed if expressions of the rational places and Riemann-Roch spaces corresponding to X are known, due to the description in Proposition 13. Proof: Take pairwise distinct rational points Q, P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n ∈ X , and define μ 2 = t + 2g − 1, μ 1 = r − 1 and μ ( j ) = δ j − 1, for j = 1, 2, . . . , h, and where the elements in are r
Observe that t ≥ 0 implies that μ 2 > 2g − 2, r > t + 2g implies that μ 1 > μ 2 , and δ 1 ≤ n implies that μ (1) < n. Defining G 2 = μ 2 Q, G 1 = μ 1 Q and G ( j ) = μ ( j ) Q, for j = 1, 2, . . . , h, the assumptions in the previous proposition are satisfied and thus the result follows. Finally, as remarked at the beginning of this section, the requirements to explicitly construct the corresponding schemes are explained at the end of [31, Sec. 2.3].
Remark 15: Observe that the parameters in the previous corollary are close to the optimal values, in view of Lemma 3, whenever the genus g is close to 0. As a particular case, taking curves of genus g = 0 (such as the projective line, which is the case of Reed-Solomon codes), we obtain schemes with optimal parameters, which are the ones obtained in [3] and [19] .
In this way, we have reduced the problem of finding long secret sharing schemes with low decoding bandwidth to the well studied problem of finding irreducible projective curves with many rational points and low genus [20] , [31] , [34] .
In the next subsection, we will give a well-known explicit family of algebraic geometry codes and apply it to the previous corollary.
B. Using Hermitian Codes
In this subsection, we apply Corollary 14 to the case where X is a Hermitian curve. These curves give the so-called Hermitian codes (see [30] , [32] , and [33, Sec. VI] or [17, Sec. VI]), which are not MDS but are considered in many cases in practice to be better than Reed-Solomon codes for the same information rate, since they are considerably longer and still have a large minimum Hamming distance (See [33, Sec. VI] for a discussion). Assume that the field size is a perfect square q = u 2 , and consider the projective plane curve X defined by x u+1 − y u z − yz u = 0. This curve is called a Hermitian curve and has N = u 3 + 1 = √ q 3 + 1 rational points, and genus
Specializing Corollary 14 to these curves, we obtain the following result:
Proposition 16: Let X be a Hermitian curve over F q , where q = u 2 . Let Q, P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P u 3 be its N = u 3 + 1 rational points, let u 2 −u +2 ≤ n ≤ u 3 and define D = P 1 + P 2 +· · ·+ P n . Let 0 ≤ t < r ≤ n be such that r − t > 2g = u 2 − u, and let ⊆ [r, n] with r ∈ . The corresponding secret sharing scheme in Corollary 14 constructed using X has information rate /n = (r − t − q + √ q)/( √ q 3 ), reconstruction r , privacy t and, for any δ ∈ and any I ⊆ [n] of size δ, it holds that
These schemes can be explicitly constructed using explicit descriptions of the generator matrices of the involved Hermitian codes, which can be found in [30] and [32] .
We now give an example of attainable parameters and an explicit toy example of Construction 1 using Hermitian codes:
Example 17: Take the field F q with q = 16, and let the information rate be 1 2 . The maximum length obtained by a Reed-Solomon code is n = 16. Then = 8 and r − t = 8. In this case, the decoding bandwidth for sets of size δ is
The maximum length obtained by a Hermitian code is n = 64, with genus g = 6. Then = 32 and r − t = + 2g = 44. In this case, the decoding bandwidth for sets of size δ is
. Fig. 2 shows several values of t, r/n and DB/n, for δ = n, when using Reed-Solomon codes and Hermitian codes of lengths n = 16 and n = 64, respectively. As observed in Subsection IV-A, the defect with the optimal case is only on t, while the decoding bandwidths present the same improvements with respect to r .
Example 18: We will use here the worked out example of Hermitian codes from [32] . Let q = 4 and F 4 = {0, 1, ω, ω} with ωω = ω + ω = 1. We may consider that the Hermitian curve has equation x 3 + y 3 + z 3 = 0 after a transformation, and it has the 9 rational points Q = (0, 1, 1), P 1 = (1, 0, ω) , (1, 0, ω) , P 3 = (1, 0, 1), P 4 = (1, ω, 0), P 5 = (1, ω, 0), P 6 = (1, 1, 0), P 7 = (0, ω, 1), P 8 = (0, ω, 1). In such case, the genus is g = 1 and the codes C(D, μQ), for μ = 1, 2, 3, 4, where D = 8 i=1 P i , are μ-dimensional and generated by the first μ rows of the matrix ⎛ ⎜ ⎜ ⎝ 
C. Asymptotic Behaviour for a Fixed Finite Field
In this subsection, we use the secret sharing schemes based on one-point AG codes in Corollary 14 to obtain sequences of schemes that are communication efficient and whose lengths go to infinity while being defined over a fixed finite field F q . We treat only Construction 1 for simplicity on the asymptotic parameters, being Construction 2 analogous. In this way, we show that the defect in the decoding bandwidth in the schemes in Corollary 14 with respect to the optimal values given by (4) depends only on the field size q and not on the length n, meaning that, for a given defect, we may fix a suitable field size, and let the lengths be arbitrarily large.
As observed in Remark 15, Corollary 14 states the existence of communication efficient schemes depending on the existence of irreducible projective curves X over F q with as many rational points and small genus as possible (and explicit schemes can be constructed if data about X is known). Therefore, it will be essential to make use of Ihara's constant [20] A(q) = lim sup
where the limit is taken over all irreducible projective curves X over F q of genus g(X ) > 0, and where N(X ) denotes the number of rational points in X . Serre's lower bound [27] and the Drinfeld-Vlȃduţ upper bound [34] state that
for a constant c > 0 that does not depend on q, and where the equality A(q) = √ q − 1 holds if q is a perfect square [20] .
See also [12, Sec. 12.7.7] , [18, Sec. 2.9] , and [31, Ch. 7] for more details on Ihara's constant and asymptotic behaviour of AG codes. We will consider sequences of irreducible projective curves
We may now state the following asymptotic consequence of Corollary 14:
Proposition 19: For any 0 ≤ T < R< D ≤ 1 with R−T > 2/A(q), there exists a strictly increasing sequence of positive integers (n i ) ∞ i=1 and a sequence of secret sharing schemes defined over F q such that, for large enough i , the i -th scheme has length n i and the following parameters:
.
As in Corollary 14, each scheme in the sequence can be explicitly constructed if expressions of the rational places and
Riemann-Roch spaces are known. Proof: Take a sequence of irreducible projective curves (X i ) ∞ i=1 satisfying N(X i ) −→ ∞ and (11). Let 2 g(X i )+2 ≤ n i ≤ N(X i ) − 1 be such that lim i→∞ n i /g(X i ) = A(q). The parameters r i = Rn i and t i = T n i satisfy r i −t i > 2 g(X i ) for i large enough. The result then follows by defining divisors and one-point AG codes as in the proof of Corollary 14.
Remark 20: Observe that (10) implies that, as q −→ ∞, it holds that 2/A(q) −→ 0, and thus by Proposition 19, it follows that the asymptotic decoding bandwidth can be as close to the optimal value as wanted for large enough finite fields. Formally, for a fixed ε > 0, we may fix q such that the difference with the optimal value is ≤ ε, and then let the lengths be arbitrary large.
Observe also that the lengths of the schemes in the previous proposition are lower bounded by (twice) the genus of the corresponding curves. We leave open how to find more flexible (shorter) schemes.
We conclude this subsection by observing that the exponentiating parameter α grows linearly with n in Construction 1 when using algebraic geometry codes. This leads to the discussion in item 2 in Subsection I-A on the share sizes of the schemes in [3] and [19] and those based on algebraic geometry codes.
Fix an information rate 0 < L < 1. [3, Construction 1] requires α = δ−t = λn, where L < λ < 1 since δ−t >r −t = .
On the other hand, Construction 1 based on a sequence of irreducible projective curves attaining equality in (9) satisfies α = λn for large lengths, where L + 2/A(q) < λ < 1. Hence the shares are of size at least n λn , that is (n log(n)) bits, in the first case, whereas they are of size O(q λn ), that is O(n) bits, in the second case.
D. Using García-Stichtenoth's Second Tower
In this subsection, we apply Proposition 19 to the socalled second tower of projective curves (X i ) ∞ i=1 introduced by García and Stictenoth [16] . This sequence of projective curves is defined over a field whose size q is a perfect square and satisfies (11) , where A(q) = √ q − 1, hence being asymptotically optimal.
Moreover, they are explicitly defined in [16] , and there are efficient algorithms to construct the generator matrices of the corresponding algebraic geometry codes, as shown in [29] (the i -th algorithm has complexity O(n 3 i log(n i ) 3 ) or O(n 3 i ) in some cases, being n i the length of the i -th code [29, Th. 7] ). We recall here that this sequence of codes is one of the few explicitly known sequences that has better asymptotic parameters than the existencial Gilbert-Varshamov bound.
Assume again that the field size is a perfect square q = u 2 , and consider García and Stictenoth's second tower of projective curves (X i ) ∞ i=1 from [16] . The i -th curve X i has N(X i ) > u i (u − 1) rational points, and its genus is given by
Specializing Proposition 19 to this tower of curves, we obtain the following result:
Proposition 21: For any finite field F q whose size q is a perfect square, and for any 0
, there exists a strictly increasing sequence of positive integers (n i ) ∞ i=1 and a sequence of secret sharing schemes defined over F q such that, for large enough i , the i -th scheme has length n i and the following parameters: 1) Information rate i /n i ≥ L = R − T − 2/( √ q − 1), 2) Reconstruction r i = Rn i , 3) Privacy t i = T n i , and for any set I ⊆ [n i ] of size δ i = Dn i , it holds that
Moreover, generator matrices for the i -th scheme can be constructed explicitly with complexity O(n 3 i log(n i ) 3 ) following the algorithm in [29, Sec. IV-A].
Proof: The proof is exactly the same as that of Proposition 19, although using García and Stictenoth's second tower of projective curves, as described in this subsection. We recall that, according to [29, Th. 7] , to construct generator matrices for the i -th scheme with the mentioned complexity, we need to choose the length of the i -th scheme as n i = u i (u − 1), which satisfies the constraints in the proof of Proposition 19. Recall also the definitions of the parameters for the codes corresponding to the i -th scheme from the proof of Corollary 14.
V. STRONGLY SECURE AND COMMUNICATION EFFICIENT SCHEMES
In this section, we see how to obtain strongly secure secret sharing schemes as in [21, Sec. 4 ] that are also communication efficient at the same time. As explained in Section I, strongly secure schemes were introduced in [37] and allow to keep components of the secret safe even when more than t shares are eavesdropped. This feature makes them behave like perfect schemes in terms of component-wise security, while having the security and efficiency in storage of ramp schemes. In this sense, strongly secure schemes provide a strict improvement on ramp schemes and an interesting alternative to perfect schemes.
A. Strong Security
Although strongly secure secret sharing schemes were introduced in [37] , we will use the extended definition from [21, Definition 18]:
Definition 22 [21] , [37] : Let σ ∈ N. We say that a secret sharing scheme F : A −→ A n is σ -strongly secure if, for all I ⊆ [] and all J ⊆ [n] with # I + # J ≤ σ + 1, it holds that
where s denotes the random variable corresponding to the secret in A , and x = F(s) denotes the random variable corresponding to the shares in A n .
Observe that, if a scheme is σ -strongly secure and σ ≤ σ , then it is also σ -strongly secure. Hence it is convenient to define the maximum strength of a scheme F : A −→ A n as
Observe that the reconstruction and privacy threshold values are also monotonous. Hence, we define for convenience the minimum reconstruction and maximum privacy thresholds, respectively, of a scheme F : A −→ A n as r min (F) = min{r ∈ N | F has r -reconstruction}, and t max (F) = max{t ∈ N | F has t-privacy}.
We next give upper bounds on σ max (F) in terms of r min (F) and t max (F) that follow easily from the definitions. They will allow us to claim the optimality of the construction in Corollary 25, which we will present in Subsection V-C.
Lemma 23: For a secret sharing scheme F : A −→ A n , it holds that
Proof: Take I = []. By definition, if the scheme has σ -strong securiry, then it holds that I (s I ; x J ) = 0 for any J ⊆ [n] of size σ + 1 − . Hence the scheme F has (σ + 1 − )-privacy. Since t max (F) is the maximum privacy threshold, it holds by definition that σ max (F) + 1 − ≤ t max (F), hence the first bound follows. The second bound follows directly from (2) .
Observe that a strongly secure secret sharing scheme not only satisfies that σ max (F) − + 1 is a privacy threshold but, in addition, if more than σ max (F) − + 1 shares are leaked and some information about the secret is obtained by an eavesdropper, we are guaranteed that no information about any collection of μ components of the secret s are leaked if the number of leaked shares is at most σ max (F) − μ + 1, for μ ≤ . In particular, no information about any single component s i ∈ A of the secret is leaked if at most σ max (F) shares are obtained by the eavesdropper.
In the optimal case σ max (F) = t max (F) + − 1 = r min (F) − 1, if t max (F) + μ shares are eavesdropped, for some μ > 0, then no information is leaked about any collection of − μ components of s, μ ≤ . Observe that in particular, no information is leaked about any component s i ∈ A if r min (F) − 1 shares are eavesdropped, which is the same amount as in an optimal perfect scheme. However, the scheme F : A −→ A n is also an optimal ramp scheme, hence having the component-wise security advantages of perfect schemes and the security and efficiency in storage of ramp schemes, as explained at the beginning of this section.
B. Massey-Type Secret Sharing Schemes
We will consider Construction 2 combined with Masseytype secret sharing schemes, which are a modification of the schemes in [23] . We omit the details regarding Construction 1 for brevity, since they are analogous.
To consider strong security, we will see the i -th component of the secret S ∈ F α× q as its i -th column S i ∈ F α×1 q , for i = 1, 2, . . . , , which is a symbol in the alphabet A = F α q . The idea behing the Massey construction is to use codes obtained by restricting longer ones to certain coordinates. In our case, we will fix throughout the section positive integers h, ≤ n, and linear codes
We may now define our modified Massey-type construction of secret sharing schemes as follows (recall the definition of restricted and shortened codes from Subsection II-A):
Definition 24: Assume that the codes in (13) satisfy the following:
1) D 1[] = F q , and 2) dim(D (1) [+1,+n] ) = dim(D (1) ). Define now the codes ,+n] , and
for j = 1, 2, . . . , h. We say that the secret sharing scheme in Construction 2 is of Massey-type if it is constructed using such linear codes
The following is the main result of this section. It states that the secret sharing scheme in Construction 2 based on the codes in the previous definition not only has the properties of the scheme in Theorem 2, but in addition we may give a lower bound on its strong security that will be useful in the next subsections. The proof is given in Appendix A.
Theorem 3: Let ⊆ [n] with elements 0 < δ h < δ h−1 < . . . < δ 2 < δ 1 ≤ n, and assume that the codes in (14) satisfy that
for j = 1, 2, . . . , h. Then the secret sharing scheme F : A −→ A n from Construction 2 using the codes in (14) has information rate /n, reconstruction r = δ h , privacy t = d(C ⊥ 2 , C (1)⊥ ) − 1 and communication overheads as in Theorem 2, where it holds that k 2 = dim(C 2 ) = dim(C 1 ) − and k ( j ) = dim(D ( j ) ) = dim(C ( j ) ), for j = 1, 2, . . . , h. In addition, it holds that
Proof: See Appendix A.
C. Optimal Strongly Secure and Communication Efficient Schemes Based on MDS Codes
In this subsection, we give the first construction of a ramp secret sharing scheme that has optimal threshold parameters with respect to its information rate (2), optimal strong security in the sense of (12) and optimal communication efficiency in the sense of (3) and (4) . The result is a consequence of Theorem 3:
Corollary 25: Fix positive integers n, r and t such that 0 ≤ t < r ≤ n, define = r − t, and let ⊆ [r, n] with r ∈ . If + n ≤ q, then we may choose the codes in (13) as MDS codes with dim(D 1 ) = r , and satisfying the conditions in Definition 24 and Theorem 3. In such case, the secret sharing scheme F : A −→ A n from Construction 2 using the codes in (14) has information rate /n, reconstruction r , privacy t (hence = r −t is optimal by (2)), optimal decoding bandwidth (meaning equality in (3) and (4)) for any δ ∈ and any set I ⊆ [n] of size δ, and in addition it has maximum strength
which is optimal by (12) . In particular, it holds that Proof: First if + n ≤ q, then we may take the codes in (13) as nested Reed-Solomon codes, which are MDS, with dim(D 1 ) = r and satisfying the conditions in Definition 24 and Theorem 3. Now by Theorem 3, we only need to show that d(G ⊥ i ) ≥ r , for i = 1, 2, . . . , . Since D 1 is MDS, the linear code G i is again MDS, which implies in turn that G ⊥ i is MDS. The length of this latter code is + n − 1 and its dimension is dim(G ⊥ i ) = dim(D ⊥ 1 ) = + n − r , therefore d(G ⊥ i ) = r , and we are done.
Observe that the requirement on the field size (q ≥ +n) is the same as in previous optimal strongly secure schemes [26] , and the expansion of the alphabet size is the same as in previous optimal communication efficient schemes [3] , [19] .
For each component of the secret S i ∈ A, the scheme behaves as an optimal perfect scheme (as Shamir's scheme), and for the entire secret S ∈ A , it behaves as an optimal ramp scheme. Therefore, it has the component-wise security advantages of the first and the security and storage efficiency of the second, while being communication efficient at the same time.
D. Strongly Secure and Communication Efficient Schemes Based on Algebraic Geometry Codes
In this subsection, we extend Corollary 25 by using general AG codes. In this way, we overcome the limitation on the field size in the previous construction, at the cost of near optimality. Analogous strongly secure schemes based on AG codes, but without communication efficiency, have been given in [24] .
We give a construction analogous to that in Corollary 14: Corollary 26: If there exists an irreducible projective curve X over F q with N ≥ + n + 1 rational points and genus g, then for any 0 ≤ t < r ≤ n with = r − t − 2g, and any ⊆ [r, n] with r ∈ , there exists a secret sharing scheme F : A −→ A n with information rate /n, reconstruction r , privacy t and, for any δ ∈ and any I ⊆ [n] of size δ, it holds that
In addition, the scheme has maximum strength
In particular, it holds that
Moreover, the scheme can be explicitly constructed if expressions of the rational places and Riemann-Roch spaces corresponding to X are known.
Proof: As in the proof of Corollary 14, take pairwise distinct rational points Q, P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P +n ∈ X , and define μ 1 = r − 1 and μ ( j ) = δ j − 1, for j = 1, 2, . . . , h, where the elements in are r = δ h < δ h−1 < . . . < δ 2 < δ 1 ≤ n. Define E = P 1 + P 2 + · · · + P +n , and the AG codes
for j = 1, 2, . . . , h. Since 2g − 2 < μ 1 < n, it holds that dim(D 1 ) = μ 1 − g + 1 ≥ by Lemma 11. Hence by rearranging the points P i if necessary, we may assume that
by Lemma 11 since 2g − 2 < μ (1) < n < + n. Therefore the assumptions in Definition 24 are satisfied.
On the other hand, the codes in (14) are given by
for j = 1, 2, . . . , h, where deg(μ 1 Q − P 1 − P 2 − · · · − P ) = μ 1 − = t + 2g − 1. Therefore, the assumptions in Proposition 13 are satisfied and hence the result follows, except for the claim on the maximum strength, which we now prove. For a fixed i ∈ [], observe that G i = C(P 1 + P 2 + · · · + P i + · · · + P +n , μ 1 Q − P i ).
Since 2g − 2 < μ 1 − 1 < + n − 1, it follows that dim(G i ) = μ 1 − g by Lemma 11. Therefore, it holds that d(G ⊥ i ) ≥ μ 1 − 2g + 1 by Lemma 10. Hence the scheme has maximum strength
by Theorem 3, and we are done.
In the same way as in Subsection IV-C, we may give the following asymptotic consequence, which shows again that the defect in the decoding bandwidth with respect to the optimal case depends only on the field size q and not on the length n. Again, this means that we may fix a suitable field size for a given defect, and then let the lengths be arbitrary large.
Corollary 27: For any 0 ≤ T < R< D ≤ 1 with R − T > 4/A(q), there exists a strictly increasing sequence of positive integers (n i ) ∞ i=1 and a sequence of secret sharing schemes defined over F q such that, for large enough i , the i -th scheme has length n i and the following parameters:
In addition, the i -th scheme has maximum strength
As in Corollary 14, each scheme in the sequence can be explicitly constructed if expressions of the rational places and Riemann-Roch spaces are known. Proof: The proof is the same as that of Proposition 19. However, we now need that i + n i + 1 ≤ N i , where N i is the number of rational points in the i -th projective curve X i . Since i ≤ n i , we may take N i ≥ 2n i + 1 and hence g i /n i −→ 2/A(q).
We may also give analogous examples as in Section IV using Hermitian codes and García and Stichtenoth's second tower of projective curves. The only adjustment is that we have to substitute the number of rational points N by n ++1 instead of n + 1. We leave the details to the reader.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have given a new framework to construct communication efficient secret sharing schemes based on sequences of nested linear codes, extending the previous Shamir-type communication efficient schemes from the literature. We have given two general constructions, one with small alphabet but non-universal low decoding bandwidths, and one with large alphabet but universal low decoding bandwidths.
By specializing the codes to algebraic geometry codes, we have obtained communication efficient secret sharing schemes with low decoding bandwidths and large lengths for a fixed finite field, in contrast with previous works. The obtained near optimality implies that, for a given deffect with the optimal case, we may fix a suitable field size and let the lengths be arbitrary large. Moreover, we have seen that the loss is on the privacy thresholds, as in previous schemes based on algebraic geometry codes, whereas the improvement on the reconstruction threshold is the same as in the optimal cases.
We have also obtained constructions of secret sharing schemes that are communication efficient and strongly secure at the same time. In particular, we have obtained the first secret sharing schemes with optimal communication efficiency and optimal strong security, which has the component-wise security advantages of optimal perfect schemes and the security and storage efficiency of optimal ramp schemes, being also communication efficient. Their field sizes are however lower bounded by (but still linear on) the lengths, as previous optimal strongly secure schemes. We have then given a construction based on algebraic geometry codes with large lengths for a fixed finite field, at the cost of near optimal communication efficiency and near optimal strong security in the same sense as in the previous paragraph.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF THEOREM 3
In this appendix, we prove Theorem 3. First, to obtain the information rate and communication overheads as in Theorem 2, we need to verify that the dimensions of the codes in (14) satisfy the hypotheses in Subsection III-B.
On the one hand, we have that dim(D (1) [+1,+n] ) = dim(D (1) ).
Therefore the projection map from any of the linear codes D ( j ) onto the coordinates in [ + 1, + n] is a vector space isomorphism. Thus
for all j = 1, 2, . . . , h. Now since D 1[] = F q , it holds that = dim(D 1[+1,+n] )−dim(D [+1,+n] 1 ) = dim(C 1 ) − dim(C 2 ).
Hence the parameters of the codes in (14) are as in Subsection III-B, and we only need to prove the lower bound on the strong security in Theorem 3. It follows by combining the two following lemmas, where the first one is [21, Th. 19] . We recall the proof for convenience of the reader. Lemma 28 [21] : Assuming that the secret S ∈ F α× q is uniformly distributed, it holds that I (S I ; X J ) = Proof: Since we are assuming that the random variable S is uniform on F α× q , it follows that its columns are uniformly distributed in the alphabet A = F α q and statistically independent. Hence the following equalities follow from the chain rule of conditional entropy (see [11, Th. 2.5.1] ):
H (S i j | X J , S i 1 , S i 2 , . . . , S i j −1 ) = u j =1 I (S i j ; X J , S i 1 , S i 2 , . . . , S i j −1 ). Proof: Since D 1[] = F q , then by definition of the codes in (14) , we may choose a generator matrix of D (1) of the form
where the matrices G c ∈ F ×n q , G 2 ∈ F k 2 ×n q and G where λ j ∈ F α×1 q , for j = 1, 2, . . . , k 1 , and λ j = 0 if j / ∈ { j 1 , j 2 , . . . , j k }, and where the vectors D u,v are defined from (λ 1 , λ 2 , . . . , λ k 1 ) ∈ F α×k 1 q as in Subsection III-B (that is, considering (R, S) = (λ 1 , λ 2 , . . . , λ k 1 )).
First, ϕ is well-defined since G has full rank. Secondly, we see that it is one to one by an iterative reconstruction argument as in item 3 in the proof of Theorem 2, due to the recursive definition of the matrices D u,v . We leave the details to the reader. Hence we conclude that
Therefore, as in the proof of item 2 in Theorem 2, it holds that
where the last inequality follows from Lemma 7, since #(I ∪ J ) ≤ d(G ⊥ i ) − 1, and we are done.
APPENDIX B MULTIPLICATIVE SCHEMES
In this appendix we study parameters for which the secret sharing schemes in this paper are multiplicative or strongly multiplicative, following [9] . We will consider the Masseytype schemes from Subsection V-D, and we will show that they may compute α products over F q or α products in F q , in parallel in both cases, while keeping their communication efficiency. It is left as open problem whether they are multiplicative over F q α .
Consider codes as in Corollary 26 and its proof, and let F : A −→ A n be the corresponding secret sharing scheme. Let * be the coordinate-wise product either in F α q or in F α q . In the second case, we redefine the divisor E from the proof of Corollary 26 as E = R + P +1 + P +2 + · · · + P +n , where R is an F q -rational point in X of degree over F q .
To consider multiplicative properties as in [9] , we define a new randomized function F : A −→ A n , where if v = i λ i (s i * u i ), for λ i ∈ F q and s i , u i ∈ F α q or F α q , then
where is the coordinate-wise product in F αn q on the righthand side of the last equation.
The new randomized function F is obviously well-defined and linear over F q and hence can be described as in Definition 4. Following [9] , we say that F is multiplicative (resp. r -strongly multiplicative) if F has n-reconstruction (resp. r -reconstruction). Equivalently, the product of two secrets can be recovered linearly by the resharing and recombination processes described in [13, Secs. 6 and 7] .
Assume now that 2μ (1) = 2δ 1 − 2 < n. We will show that then F has n-reconstruction. To that end, it is enough to show that if λ i ∈ F q and f i , g i ∈ L(μ (1) Q) are such that f (P +1 ) = f (P +2 ) = . . . = f (P +n ) = 0,
where f = i λ i f i g i , then f = 0. However, if (15) holds, then f ∈ L(2μ (1) Q − P +1 − P +2 − · · · − P +n ).
Since deg(2μ (1) Q− P +1 − P +2 −· · ·−P +n ) = 2μ (1) −n < 0, then f = 0 by [31, Corollary 1.4.12], and we are done. Similarly F is r-strongly multiplicative if 2μ (1) = 2δ 1 −2 < r . In the case of the optimal schemes from Corollary 25, we see that they are multiplicative if 2δ 1 < n. Even though this allows for reasonable parameters, such as = n/6, t = n/6, r = n/3 and δ 1 = n/2, it would be desirable to obtain multiplicative schemes with the only constraint 2r < n (as in [9] ), but arbitrary ⊆ [r, n]. Overcoming this issue is left as open problem for future research.
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